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RHOADS V. SOMMER: ATTORNEY'S LIENS ARE IN REM 
CLAIMS WHICH SURVIVE A CLIENT'S BANKRUPTCY 
DISCHARGE EVEN IF NO NOTICE IS GIVEN PRIOR TO 
THE BANKRUPTCY. 
By: Terrence Decker 
In a matter of first impression, the Court of Appeals of Maryland 
held that attorney's liens are in rem claims which survive a client's 
bankruptcy discharge despite an absence of notice prior to bankruptcy. 
Rhoads v. Sommer, 401 Md. 131, 931 A.2d 508 (2007). More 
specifically, the Court held that an attorney's lien pursuant to section 
10-501 of the Business Occupations and Professions Article ("section 
10-501") is an in rem claim which allows for an attorney to pursue 
debts after bankruptcy has been filed. Id. at 131,931 A.2d at 508. 
In September 1993, Standard Federal Savings Association 
("SF SA") terminated Lori Rhoads ("Rhoads") from her position as 
Director of Financial Analysis at SFSA. In January 1994, Rhoads 
retained Fred S. Sommer ("Sommer") to pursue an employment 
discrimination lawsuit against her former employers. Sommer filed 
suit in the United States District Court for the District of Maryland, 
alleging violations of federal statutes, common law duties, and county 
human rights laws. The district court granted SFSA's motion for 
summary judgment on nine of Rhoads' ten claims. A jury found in 
favor of SFSA on the remaining claim. 
In March 1998, Rhoads filed for Chapter 7 bankruptcy, naming 
Sommer as a creditor holding a $190,000 legal services claim. Rhoads 
also disclosed on her financial statement a civil claim for damages of 
which time for appeal had not expired. The bankruptcy trustee 
determined that there was no property for distribution from the estate 
and granted her discharge under 11 U.S.C. § 727 (2000). This 
determination released to Rhoads any interest she may have had in the 
civil litigation. Sommer then discussed an appeal of the district court's 
judgment with Rhoads. In August 1998, after disagreements, Sommer 
officially withdrew his representation of Rhoads. In September 1998, 
Sommer sent Rhoads notice of his attorney's lien pursuant to section 
91 
92 University of Baltimore Law Forum [Vol. 38 
10-501 and Maryland Rule 2-652. Also in September 1998, Rhoads 
filed a pro se appeal with the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Fourth Circuit. The court of appeals reversed the decision of the 
district court on one issue and remanded the case for a new trial. In 
December 2002, a federal jury ruled in favor of Rhoads awarding her 
$120,006. 
In December 2004, Sommer filed a complaint in the Circuit Court 
for Montgomery County to enforce the remaining $159,729.74 of the 
attorney's lien against Rhoads. Rhoads filed a motion to dismiss and 
Sommer filed a motion for summary judgment. The circuit court 
granted Rhoads' motion because the plain language of the retainer 
agreement led the court to conclude that Sommer waived his right to a 
statutory lien because he did not obtain a judgment or settlement in 
Rhoads' favor. Sommer appealed and the Court of Special Appeals of 
Maryland reversed the circuit court, holding instead that the retainer 
agreement did not waive Sommer's statutory lien. Furthermore, the 
Court of Special Appeals of Maryland held that the lien was not 
extinguished in the bankruptcy despite Sommer failing to file a proof 
of claim in bankruptcy. Rhoads petitioned for a writ of certiorari, 
which the Court of Appeals ofMary~and granted. 
After concluding that the plain language of the retainer agreement 
did not waive Sommer's statutory lien rights, the Court of Appeals of 
Maryland first considered when the lien was established and what 
notice was required, if any, to establish the lien. Rhoads, 401 Md. at 
148-54, 931 A.2d at 518-21. Rhoads argued that any debt owed to 
Sommer under the retainer agreement was discharged in bankruptcy 
before any lien was created. Id. at 154-55, 931 A.2d at 521-22. 
Rhoads further contended that section 10-501 grants an attorney the 
right to assert a lien but requires an attorney to provide formal notice 
and bring a formal action to enforce the lien. Rhoads, 401 Md. at 155, 
931 A.2d at 522. The Court disagreed. Id. at 155,931 A.2d at 522. 
The Court looked to the plain language of section 10-501 which 
states "an attorney at law [has] a lien on: (1) a cause of action or 
proceeding of a client of the attorney at law from the time the cause of 
action arises or the proceeding begins." Rhoads, 401 Md. at 155,931 
A.2d at 522. The Court held that a lien is established at the inception 
of a cause of action. Id. at 155, 931 A.2d at 522. Therefore, the Court 
determined that the lien took effect when Sommer originally filed the 
complaint in federal district court on behalf of Rhoads in January of 
1994. !d. at 156,931 A.2d at 522-23. 
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The Court then looked to Maryland Rule 2-652 ("rule 2-652") to 
detennine whether notice was required, and if so, whether it was given 
to preserve the lien from discharge by bankruptcy. Rhoads, 401 Md. at 
156,931 A.2d at 522-23. Rule 2-652 states that only written notice by 
certified mail or personal delivery upon the person whom the lien is to 
be enforced is needed to assert the lien. Rhoads, 401 Md. at 156, 931 
A.2d at 522. Rule 2-652 merely provides a method of asserting the 
lien and does not mandate that an attorney give notice to a client prior 
to a bankruptcy proceeding in order to preserve the lien. Rhoads, 401 
Md. at 156, 931 A.2d at 522. The Court held that although Sommer 
gave notice after Rhoads filed for bankruptcy, Sommer's lien existed 
before Rhoads filed for bankruptcy, and the notice given to Rhoads 
was sufficient for Sommer to enforce his lien against her. Id. at 156, 
931 A.2d at 522-23. 
The Court next addressed whether the lien was an in rem or an in 
personam claim to help establish whether the lien survived the 
bankruptcy discharge. Id. at 156, 931 A.2d at 523. A discharge in 
bankruptcy releases debtors from personal liability for "pre-petition 
debts," but it does not discharge in rem claims such as Rhoads' 
interest in her pending civil litigation. Id. at 157-58, 931 A.2d at 523-
24. The Court agreed with the court in Hoxsey v. HoffPauir that 
"proceedings to enforce such [attorney's] lien[ s] are considered as 
proceedings in rem and may be enforced only against the proceeds of a 
judgment secured in the particular case." Rhoads, 401 Md. at 156-57, 
931 A.2d at 523 (quoting Hoxsey v. Hoffpauir, 180 F.2d 84, 87 (5th 
Cir. 1950)). The Court recognized that a section 10-501 lien is an 
action in rem because the claim is against the interest the client holds 
in a pending judgment or settlement. Rhoads, 401 Md. at 157, 931 
A.2d at 523. 
Rhoads argued that her bankruptcy discharge released her from 
personal liability. Id. at 157-58, 931 A.2d at 523-24. Rhoads further 
asserted that since she listed Sommer as a creditor holding an in 
personam claim and Sommer was notified of his claim, but failed to 
file a proof of claim, this debt was discharged through bankruptcy. Id. 
at 159,931 A.2d at 524. The Court, looking to Johnson v. Home State 
Bank, detennined that the discharge of Sommer's in personam claim 
did not affect Sommer's in rem claim. Rhoads, 401 Md. at 158, 931 
A.2d at 523-24 (citing Johnson v. State Home Bank, 501 U.S. 78, 84 
(1991)). 
The Court then detennined that because the bankruptcy trustee 
released the property back to Rhoads, the interest in the civil litigation 
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became available to creditors. Rhoads, 401 Md. at 158, 931 A.2d at 
524. The Court noted that, despite the fact that Rhoads filed for 
bankruptcy and listed her active civil claim for damages on her 
financial statement, the bankruptcy trustee released any interest in the 
civil litigation back to Rhoads upon concluding there was no property 
available for distribution. Id. at 138-39, 931 A.2d at 512. The Court 
further concluded that when the in rem claim was abandoned by the 
bankruptcy trustee, Sommer was not obligated to file any proof of 
claim for his lien to survive the bankruptcy discharge, even though 
notice of the lien was not given until after the bankruptcy. Id. at 158-
59, 931 A.2d at 524. Thus, Sommer was entitled to assert his 
attorney's lien against Rhoads' judgment, limited to the terms of the 
parties' retainer agreement. Id. at 164, 931 A.2d at 527. 
The Court of Appeals of Maryland's holding in Rhoads allows 
attorneys who take all the appropriate steps to place a lien on a client 
to recover debts owed to the attorney by the client. The Court's 
decision allows for attorneys in Maryland to recover debts owed to 
them by their clients despite a bankruptcy discharge of all of the 
client's personal liability. The Court's plain reading of section 10-501 
further safeguards attorneys from being cheated by their clients who 
file for bankruptcy to escape from paying attorney's fees. The ruling 
prevents clients from receiving the fruits of their recoveries without 
paying for lawyers' services by which the recoveries were obtained. 
